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CASE COMMENTS
large enough to justify the belief that mental disturbance of a
psychotic nature existed at the time of the trial and before." (1949)
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1929. Although mere psychosis is not
enough to make one incompetent-under the "rational defense"
test noted above-to stand trial, this statement does indicate a
realization of the problem of subsequent determination of competency.
Ideally then, the insanity of an accused, as affecting his competency to stand trial, should be tested at the time of such trial,
e.g., under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, as in Hill v. United States. ALI CODE
CGim. PROC. § 307 (1931). Since, due to various reasons, this is not
always accomplished, a rational method of deterriination at a time
subsequent to the trial is required. The purely legalistic review
of the record in Bishop v. United States, as it is pointed out above,
leaves much to be desired.
In United States v. Fooks, supra, the court, aided by psychiatric
advice in the form of expert testimony, based its findings upon a
combined consideration of the records of D's trials and upon psychiatric examinations subsequent thereto. Id. at 535, 536. Both
current evidence and record material were fully utilized. If current
and probative reports are also relied upon then, proper results
can be reached even under the requirement of Bishop v. United
States that the record be utilized in the determination. The procedure followed by the court in United States v. Foohs would seem
to be more fruitful in reaching the basic issue of competency to
stand trial than a subsequent view only of stale and often incomplete records of trial. If it is a desirable policy not to subject
persons who are incapable of understanding their positions to trial
and punishment, then it is as necessary to have an accurate and fair
method of subsequently determining their competency as it is to
have a like procedure prior to or concurrent with the trial.
B. F. D.

EMINENT DOMAIN-FEDERAL CONDEMNATION J1UDGMENTS-DocKAND INDEXING WITH STATE RECORDs.-Federal government
obtained timber land in a condemnation proceeding. The judgment was correctly docketed and indexed with the clerk of the
federal district court. It also was docketed in the office of the
county clerk but was indexed and cross indexed without the name
of one of the parties. Under the state law this was necessary in order
to give a subsequent purchaser constructive notice of judgment
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liens on real property. The issue was whether federal condemnation judgments must be docketed, indexed and cross indexed with
state records for a subsequent purchaser to have notice. Held, that
docketing and cross indexing of federal judgments of condemnation
with state court records is not required as a condition of validity
as against subsequent purchasers from condemnee in absence of an
act of congress so providing. Judgment affirmed. Norman Lumber
Co. v. United States, 223 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1955).
The court was faced with the immediate problem of establishing the validity of the government's title, and it found it to be
well settled that federal condemnation is a proceeding in rem
divesting all proprietary rights and interests in the property,
founding a new title and extinguishing all previous rights. Also
it recognized that the only way this title could be divested was by
virtue of congressional authorization. Thus the court was led to
the necessity of examining the federal statutes which seemed to have
this effect.
After an examination of the old conformity acts which, prior
to August 1, 1951, prescribed that procedure in federal courts in
regard to condemnation proceedings should conform to state court
procedure, the court, in view of long standing decisions, concluded
that these acts applied only to that procedure in procuring the
judgment and not to those subsequent thereto. Therefore, under
these former acts it was not necessary for such judgments to be
docketed and cross indexed with state court records in order to
provide notice to a subsequent purchaser. As further evidence of
this fact, the court pointed out that there is no provision therefor
in the present procedure which took effect August 1, 1951. FED.
R. Civ. P. 71 (a).
The defendant in the principal case relied upon the Lien of
Judgment Act claiming it provided for such docketing and cross
indexing. 25 STAT. 357 (1888), 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1940). This act,
in essence, states that judgments rendered in United States district
courts shall be liens on property located in the state to the same extent and under the same conditions as state court judgments upon
provision being made by the law of the state for the docketing of
such district court judgments. North Carolina, the situs of the land
in question, and West Virginia provide such laws. W. VA. CoDE
c. 38, art. 3, § 5 (Michie 1955). In North Carolina state court
judgments become liens on real estate only when docketed, indexed
and cross indexed in the county where the real estate is situate.
Since West Virginia is also a state within the fourth circuit, it is

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss1/12

2

P.: Eminent Domain--Federal Condemnation Judgments--Docketing and Ind
CASE COMMENTS
important to note that, under the West Virgina law, judgments
need only to be docketed in the county where the land lies in order
to become liens on such lands. W. VA. CODE C. 38, art. 3, § 7
(Michie 1955). However, the same problem as set forth by the
principal case would arise in West Virginia if the judgment was
not so docketed. Thus it seems that under North Carolina law,
in order for a subsequent purchaser to be put on constructive notice,
it is necessary that the judgment be docketed, indexed and cross
indexed, while in West Virginia the judgment need only be docketed, to provide such notice. It, therefore, appears that if the Lien
of Judgment Act applies to federal condemnation judgments, it
would be an act which could result in the divestment of title of
the federal government if constructive notice is not properly provided to a subsequent purchaser through the workings of the
statutory plan. However, the court in the principal case, in reviewing this possibility, held that condemnation judgments do not
come under the Lien of Judgment Act since that act relates to the
acquisition of liens upon the lands of those against whom judgments
are rendered, and not to the transfer of land itself as in condemnation proceedings.
From the examination of these federal acts it is apparent that
none of them offer the solution which is necessary to permit a subsequent purchaser to divest the government of a condemnation title
on the grounds that he does not have constructive notice. The
practical effect of such a holding is that one is considered to have
constructive notice of federal condemnation proceedings from the
fact the judgment is recorded in the office of the clerk of the federal
district court. Thus the practicing attorney must beware, since
it appears that to be completely safe in abstracting a title to real
estate, in addition to normal procedure, it will also be necessary to
check the office of the clerk of the district court for evidence of
federal condemnation judgments which may not be correctly
docketed or indexed and cross indexed in the records of the county
clerk.
While the effect of the holding of the principal case appears to
be undesirable, it seems, after careful examination of the authorities, that the court could have reached no other correct decision.
The law, as it exists at present, will allow no other result. Congress
saw fit to solve a similar problem in regard to federal court judgments acting as liens by passing the beforementioned Lien of Judgment Act. Basically, the same statutory scheme would be highly
desirable in regard to condemnation judgments. Whether or not
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this would be the best solution to this question, it is obviously a
problem which can only be solved by appropriate congressional
action.
T. E. P.
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falsely imprisoned by a municipal officer, brought
suit in United States district court, pleading a violation of rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, as implemented by the
civil rights statute, to establish federal jurisdiction in the absence
of diversity of citizenship. Held, sustaining the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, that P had not pleaded sufficient
facts to: show "state action" to warrant federal court jurisdiction.
Dinneen v. Williams, 219 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1955).
The court distinguishes the principal case from Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946), saying that where federal officers are involved
a more sketchy statement of facts will suffice. Bell v. Hood held
that federal courts have jurisdiction of a suit when the plaintiff
chooses to base his claim on the violation of a right having its
foundation in the United States Constitution and amendments
although the action was one generally cognizable in the state courts
and the only remedy available would be under state law. Bell
v. Hood involved a transgression by federal officers but this should
not distinguish the cases as the basis of that court's decision was
not the capacities of the officers involved but the foundation of the
right violated.
The plaintiff in the principal case claimed under the fourteenth
amendment, since the offense was committed by a municipal officer,
whereas in Bell v. Hood the claim was made under the fourth and
fifth amendments, since the trespass was committed by federal
officers. The court, in the principal case, is possibly distinguishing
the two cases on this basis. The court stated that plaintiff must
plead sufficient facts to show "state action". What it means by this
is not too lear. The pleading mentions the Civil Rights Statute,
62 STAT. 932 (1948), 28 U.S.C. 1343 (1951), but this should not
require the plaintiff to show the violation occurred under color
of statute, ordinance, custom or usage of the state. Presumably,
the court by "state action" means that the pleading must show
that the violation was an act of the state, since the officer involved
was a municipal officer. This should not be necessary. It should
be sufficient to show only that the right violated has its foundation
PRISONMENT.-P,
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